GrapheneOS is a privacy project and heavily improves it with important privacy protections including Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, secure paste and much more. It preserves all of the standard privacy and security of AOSP while greatly improving upon both. It has major improvements to both privacy and security, but it's also starting from the point of the standard privacy and security being intact.

GrapheneOS doesn't connect to Google servers by default and avoids integrating any privileged access for either Google apps or partial replacements for those. The main operating systems integrating microG included always granted privileged access for microG, Google Play executables downloaded by microG (droidguard) which run with the privileged access it's granted and other Google apps including Android Auto.

/e/ greatly reduces both privacy and security compared to AOSP through not keeping up with standard patches, not providing important standard privacy/security protections and adding problematic services. It lags behind incomplete backports to older releases by many weeks or even months while not fully providing all the patches. They set an inaccurate Android security patch level across devices so users believe they have a lot of patches they don't. Users are also led to believe those are all the Android privacy/security patches when it's a minority of the overall patches due to most not being backported. Firmware, driver and kernel updates are largely not provided by /e/ even when those are available from the vendors including for Pixels. Those have extreme delays when they are provided, often being years behind for Pixels.

/e/ also doesn't keep all of the standard security model intact due to the changes made by LineageOS and /e/.

/e/ also adds a bunch of privacy invasive services along with rolling back privacy and security in many other ways.

https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-stand...

MicroG: Free-libre re-implementation of Google's proprietary Android user space