Yes and no.

Grover's algorithm is provably optimal [0]. No quantum algorithm will ever find an n-bit key by queries to any reasonable sort of oracle faster than Grover's algorithm, and Grover's algorithm is way too slow to be a serious problem.

But symmetric ciphers are not black boxes. They're mostly built on some variant of a Feistel network, which is a very nice construction for turning a messy function into an invertible function that, in a potentially very strong sense, acts like a cryptographically secure permutation.

When I was in grad school, one project I contemplated but never spent any real time on was trying to either generate a real security proof for quantum attacks on Feistel networks or to come up with interesting quantum attacks. And there is indeed an interesting quantum attack against 3-round Feistel networks [1].

This is interesting, because, depending on what sort of security is needed, three or four rounds of Feistel network are sufficient against classical attack [2].

Now ciphers like AES have many more than 3 rounds, so hopefully they're fine. But maybe they're not. My intuition is that there is probably a reasonably small n1 and a reasonably small n2 >= n1 (probably constants, maybe logarithmic in numbers of bits) for which there is no quantum algorithm that can break symmetric crypto given classical query access even to the round functions (n1) or quantum query access to the round functions (n2) [3], but I'm not aware of any proof of anything of the sort. And my intuition definitely should be be trusted fully! (Maybe, even if I'm wrong, there is still a number of rounds that is sufficient for security against query access to the entire cipher.)

[0] The classic result is https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9701001 and there are newer, more exact results, e.g. https://arxiv.org/abs/0810.3647

[1] https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5513654

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feistel_cipher

[3] It would be extremely cool if someone built quantum computers and networks and storage such that two parties that don't trust each other could actually communicate and exchange (interesting [5]) qubits. I've written some fun papers on the possible implications of this. If we ever get the technology, then it might actually be meaningful to consider things like chosen-quantum-ciphertext attacks against a classical symmetric cipher. But that's many, many years away, and, in any case, an attacker will only ever get to do a quantum query attack against a cryptosystem if a victim lets them. [4] Otherwise all queries will be classical.

[4] Or in very complex settings where there is an obfuscated black box, for example. This may be relevant for zk-snarks or similar constructions.

[5] I don’t consider the optical qubits exchanged in commercial devices that supposedly implement quantum key distribution to be interesting. To the vendors of such devices, sorry.

Quantum Computers Are Not a Threat to 128-Bit Symmetric Keys